Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Part III

In Genesis, the creation of the world is described as the work of six days. Perhaps it's a coincidence that there happens to be six Meditations. Perhaps not. Listing the Six Days might be useful:

1. Separating light from darkness
2. Separating the sky from the waters
3. Separating the dry land from the seas; sprouting vegetation
4. Separating day from night, the sun, moon, and stars
5. Creation of the sea creatures and birds
6. Creation of the land creatures; creation of man 

In the first Meditation, Descartes' motivating goal is achieving "anything in the sciences that was stable and likely to last." Certainty is the path to reach that goal. Cutting away anything that could plausibly be denied without a logical contradiction is the negative path to certainty. And because "whatever I have accepted as most true I have acquired from or through the senses," the focus is on doubting exactly that, what he has acquired from or through the senses.

I'm a bit inclined to argue that the senses do not deceive, the mind deceives itself, e.g. you see a figure in the distance and think it is your brother but it is not, or see a bird and think it's a sparrow but it's a swallow. In both cases the senses transmit the image of what is seen and the mind judges what it is, and sometimes gets it wrong -  but isn't the fault of the mind, not the senses? But it is true that on account of this sense perception, the mind makes a mistake. Because it is sometimes mistaken, you can plausibly question anything brought to the mind by the senses and dismiss it as non-certain. 

The rest of the Meditation is spent answering objections to this idea in a dialectical way. Our sense of personal place seems certain, but we have that sense in dreams, and is it certain, i.e. is it a logical contradiction to assert, that we are not dreaming now? Perhaps not, but the images in dreams, like paintings, are based in reality and hence exist, or if not, the colors used to depict them are real and certain; more abstractly, the universal concepts we have regarding beings is real and certain - bodily nature, extension, shape, quantity, size, number, place, and time. The shape of consciousness is being worked out. These are the categories our minds seem to work in, despite rejecting as authoritative anything coming from the senses. And God made us the way we are, so we can trust categories like these. 

But what if God made us wrong and/or continually deceives us out of spite, so that our categories of space-time, place, number, material being, etc. do not correspond to reality but are imaginary? "God wouldn't let us be deceived all the time," is the obvious rejoinder from the faithful, but he lets us be deceived some of the time, and both appear to be equally foreign to his goodness. Choosing atheism leads to the same thing, since by whatever cause I exist so imperfectly in deception and error, so much weaker is that cause, and therefore so much more likely am I to be such a being who is deceived all the time on categories like space, time, place, material being, extension, etc. Thus this Meditation ends not in light, but in darkness. 

Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Part II

The deferential servant disappears immediately in the Preface to the Reader, and in its place are warnings against the hasty judgments of weaker intellects from a harried, misunderstood master. Descartes addresses two objections against his earlier work:

1. The human mind, when examining itself, does not find itself to be anything other than a thinking thing. But this does not necessitate that it is only a thinking thing
2. If a man conceives of an idea of a thing more perfect than himself, it does not follow either that the idea is more perfect than himself, or that the thing exists

Neither of these objections are resolved here. Descartes argues that objection 1 refers to the phenomenon of examining the mind, not an exhaustive definition; however, he will prove below that from this examination, it does in fact follow that the mind is only a thinking thing, and that nothing else belongs to the essence of the mind. Regarding objection 2, Descartes grants that ideas, taken as operations of the mind, cannot be greater than the mind, for an operation of the intellect, a part, is lesser than its cause, the whole. But taken as that which is represented by that operation, he will prove below how it follows that the more perfect thing really exists. 

He further cautions against hasty, careless study that does not bother to grasp the proper order of his arguments and the connections between them, and further, that readers should not pass judgment on the Meditations without reading his replies to the objections, a request I may or may not honor - since Descartes has already proven himself a liar, I don't really believe him that "it will be hard for anyone to think of any point of importance which these critics have not mentioned." It could certainly be true, but this sort of deference to a thinker isn't very reasonable, in any case. 

Curiously, after the Preface, Descartes writes a synopsis of the following six meditations. It will be useful to examine these synopses and compare them with the actual meditations - is his synopsis accurate? Does it add/omit anything important? 

1. The grounds for radical doubt, doubt carried to its extremes, so that it can form the basis of knowledge which we cannot doubt, i.e. that which is always and necessarily true - scientia or episteme. 
2. In doubting all things the mind becomes unaware that it cannot doubt its own existence, because doubt is a conscious activity. You cannot doubt that you are doubting, and a thing must exist in order to act.
3. The third meditation allegedly demonstrates the existence of God. Descartes acknowledges that while he thinks it's quite fully explained, "many obscurities may remain," a statement which is more than a little at odds with itself. 
4. The nature of knowledge as "that which we clearly and distinctly perceive." Isn't it a bit strange that the definition of knowledge comes after a demonstration for the existence of God? Further is discussed the nature of truth and falsity (but explicitly not sin, good, evil, nor anything regarding faith).
5. An account of corporeal nature and a new argument for the existence of God. All knowledge depends on the existence of God. Why would he prove again what he had already proved? 
6. Distinguishing the intellect from the imagination, the way in which the mind and the body make up a "kind of unit", and a presentation of arguments which enable the inference of material reality's being, while acknowledging material being is less certain than non-material being. 

Conspicuously absent is a meditation on the immortality of the soul, despite a) Descartes' claim that it, along with the existence of God, is the chief aim of this work, and b) God's existence being dealt with in not one but two meditations. In its place is a long digression in meditation 2's synopsis of what that argument requires:

1. Descartes' method is to lay out all the premises upon which a desired proposition depends, and this cannot be done in Meditation 2. 
2. A concept of the soul which is as clear as possible and quite distinct from every concept of body is the most important prerequisite for demonstrating immortality. This is done in Meditation 2.
3. The second prerequisite is knowing that "everything we clearly and distinctly understand is true in a way that exactly corresponds to our understanding of it". This is done in Meditation 4. 
4. The third prerequisite is a distinct concept of corporeal nature. This is partly done in Meditation 2, and partly in Meditations 5-6. 
5. All the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive as different substances are in fact truly distinct one from another. This is done in Meditation 6. 
6. Body being cannot be understood except as divisible; mind cannot be understood except as indivisible. 
7. The nature of mind and body are not only different but in some way opposite. 
8. This is enough to prove that the decay of the body does not imply the destruction of the mind

Descartes does not pursue this topic any further in Meditation 6. He asserts in the synopsis that concluding the soul is immortal depends on an account of the whole of physics, because we must understand that:

1. All substances are incorruptible and cannot cease to exist unless God withdraws his power from them.
2. Body, taken in the general sense, is a substance.
3. The human body, qua distinct from other bodies, is made up of accidents. 
4. The mind is not made up of accidents but is pure substance.
5. Even if the accidents of the mind change - different memories, desires, sensations - it is the same mind, whereas the body loses its identity if some of its parts change shape. 
6. Therefore, while the body can very easily perish, the mind is immortal by its very nature. 

This account has at least two problems: it is not clear and distinct, particularly premise 1 and how substance is "incorruptible." Therefore it does not have the quality of knowledge Descartes sets as the standard.  Second, premise 5 is false; for if my finger is amputated my body does not thereby lose its identity. Therefore the conclusion has not been demonstrated. The soul has not been proven immortal by its very nature. 

Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Part I

Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy was written in Latin, whereas his earlier Rules for the Direction of the Mind was written in French. It has two introductory sections: an address to the theological faculty of Sorbonne University, and a preface to the reader. The two sections make for some interesting contrasts, bearing in mind Maimonides' rules for understanding esoteric books. In his dedicatory letter, Descartes makes a number of notable points:

1. Unbelievers will not accept any religion and practically no moral virtue unless the the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proved
2. We must believe in God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and we believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God
3. The knowledge of God is easier to acquire than the knowledge we have of created things
4. Everything known of God can be demonstrated by natural reason alone
5. The arguments Descartes has set forth shall leave no room for the possibility that the human mind will ever discover better ones
6. Only a few people are able to follow and understand Descartes' arguments 
7. If the Sorbonne faculty promotes his work, everyone will agree with it too because they are regarded as authoritative, and this will clarify the mind and purify the morals of man on a mass scale

A flattering, fawning tone permeates the entire letter, depicting an obsequious vassal loudly entreating an exalted lord. The one passage of self-praise (the fifth point) is cloaked in religious piety, "to the greater glory of God", which would allow him to plausibly deny arrogance. It is difficult to interpret this tone as anything but performative insincerity. 

More interestingly, almost all of these points are absurd, contradict one another, or both. 

1. It is not true that non-Christians will only accept religion and moral virtue if God and immortality can be proved, for three reasons: a) most people, whether Christian or not, aren't interested in those sorts of arguments at all; b) Descartes was well aware of accounts of moral virtue relying neither on the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul, e.g. the Stoic writers and the Nicomachean Ethics; and c) using reason to demonstrate God's existence and attributes has no relation to practicing moral virtue, because reason cannot determine if God will reward virtue and punish wickedness. 
2. By framing Christian belief in circular terms, he renders it absurd, and protects himself with a two-fold mask; first by identifying himself explicitly as a believer, and second by acknowledging that "unbelievers would judge it to be circular." A genuinely Christian attitude, by contrast, would be choosing to believe in the divine revelation made known in the person of Jesus Christ. 
3. God, particularly as Christians conceive of him, is the least evident to us because he is the most unlike us - not limited, not composed of parts, not confined in time and place, not having beginning or end. It takes more effort to acquire knowledge that is less-evident to us, not less. 
4. This is either a meaningless tautology, if Descartes is referring to natural theology (e.g. Aquinas' Treatise on God, QQ. 1-27), or it is heretical, because the knowledge that comes through faith in Jesus Christ cannot be proven, and it isn't knowledge in the same way as a philosopher would understand knowledge.
5. This is so absurdly hyperbolic that to accept it would require something like an act of faith.
6. Perhaps the only true statement Descartes writes in the entire dedicatory letter, and one which the reader must seriously take to heart. 
7. Even if it were true that the Sorbonne endorsement would be as authoritative on a mass scale as Descartes claims, claiming it would trigger a Catholic revival in not just France but the whole world is absurd for the same reasons as the first point. 

With all these things being false, what is the purpose behind Descartes' seeking the endorsement of the Sorbonne? It's not because he expects a religious or philosophic revival to sweep across France and the world if he gets it (and in fact, he did not), but it would shield him against charges of impiety and atheism from other Catholic academics, who would be the most aware of this newly-published book. 

Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Part I

 Hegel is hard to understand, so I'm working through an introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit before going through the Phenomenology itself, and the Science of Logic, if I get that far. Alexandre Kojeve has high praise in Straussian circles, so I'm starting with him. I may go through Peter Kalkavage's introduction too, but the goal is to grapple with Hegel myself, unmediated. So I hope to use Kojeve as a good first teacher, and his preparation, if the forward to my edition of Introduction is correct, was spending more than six years reading nothing but Phenomenology of Spirit, which is exactly the sort of zeal that inclines me to view a man as a reliable guide. 

Most of my writing on Kojeve's book will be paraphrasing the concepts I encounter so that I can at least explain them to myself. Only after I understand the logic of his/Hegel's arguments and their content can I begin to determine if they're true. I'll start with a few pages (5-10) each day, and the book is a brief 266 pages. A first pass will take at least a month, probably two. It will be very slow going in the beginning, I expect. 

Man is Self-Consciousness. Self-consciousness is his identity. But his rational activity, reasoning, contemplating, etc. do not reveal this identity because the subject (the thinking, reasoning being) tends to lose himself in what is being thought/reasoned about to the degree that he more purely and powerfully reasons and thinks. 

Desire does this. The conscious desire of a being is what constitutes that being as an "I" and reveals it as such. It is in and as desire that man is formed and revealed to himself as an individual, an "I". The very existence of man therefore, presumes and implies desire. But animals have desire too, and lack self-consciousness. Therefore the specifically human desire that reveals the individual must be different. 

The action that satisfies desire does so by the negation (i.e. the destruction or transformation) of the desired object, e.g. food when you are hungry. The "I" of desire is an emptiness that receives a real positive content only by the negating action that satisfies desire by destroying, transforming, and assimilating the desired non-I. The positive content of that "I" is determined by the positive content of the negated non-I, in this case food. The end of desire determines the nature of the "I", so that a purely natural desire results only in a purely natural "I", the animal Sentiment of Self, not Self-Consciousness. 

Rules for the Guide

Until the modern era, when freedom of religion became dominant in the West, and atheism became increasingly associated with privilege and the ruling class, philosophers often hid their more subversive teachings in their books, and only patient, thorough study could piece them together. Philosophers did not make this explicit, for a variety of obvious reasons. 

An exception is Maimonides. In his Guide of the Perplexed, he identifies seven causes for contradictions in books:

1. A book compiles remarks from multiple sources, and sources often contradict each other 
2. The author has changed his mind about something in the course of writing the book, and left both statements intact 
3. Not every statement is to be interpreted literally. Metaphors, illustrations, analogies, etc. may appear contradictory but are not interpreted strictly 
4. Of two contradictory statements, one has not been explained properly; when it has, the contradiction disappears 
5. In teaching a student, something difficult to understand is mentioned or used as a premise in explaining something easier to understand. Later, in the appropriate place, that obscure matter is stated exactly, with precision 
6. The contradiction is concealed and manifests only after many premises and arguments expose it. It may escape the attention of the author, and escapes the attention of scholars who write books. 
7. In very difficult subjects, it is necessary to conceal some parts and disclose others. Sometimes this means the discussion proceeds on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place sometimes the discussion proceeds on the basis of a different, contradictory premise. In such cases the vulgar must remain unaware of the contradiction, and the author uses some device to conceal it.

Causes 1-2 are found in the biblical commentary Maimonides used and taught - the Mishnah, the Talmud, etc. Causes 3-4 are found in the Old Testament, in what Maimonides refers to as the books of the prophets. He raises the possibility that Cause 7 is found in the Bible, but "this is a matter for investigation" later. Cause 5 is found in the books of "those who know the truth," i.e. the wisest of philosophers. Cause 6 is found "in most of the books of authors and commentators other than those we have mentioned"; that is, not the works of those who know the truth, though sometimes Cause 7 is present there, too. More biblical commentary (Midrash) and Jewish liturgical ritual are given as examples. Cause 7 is found in his book, and by extension (note the clever wording), in the books of the wise philosophers as well. Of the seven causes, three of them reduce to inchoate noise, and two of them are used in Sacred Scripture. Maimonides himself only cares about the fifth and seventh causes. "Know this, grasp its true meaning, and remember it very well so as not to become perplexed by some of its chapters." 

"If you wish to grasp the totality of what this treatise contains, so that nothing of it will escape you, then you must connect its chapters one with another: and when reading a given chapter, your intention must be not only to understand the totality of the subject of  that chapter, but also to grasp each word that occurs in it in the course of the speech, even if that word does not belong to the intention of the chapter. For the diction of this treatise has not been chosen at haphazard, but with great exactness and exceeding precision, and with care to avoid failing any obscure point. And nothing has been mentioned out place, save with a view to explaining some matter in its proper place." 

The philosophers, when communicating their thoughts to others, are very careful to write exactly what and how they want to, and their works are crafted wholes, like a sculpture or a painting, with everything in its intended place. Using this principle of interpretation, and being alert to the fifth and seventh causes of contradiction, is how I will approach these old, so-called esoteric books.